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Context History of Events Summary and Conclusions Summary of tactics Footnotes |
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CONTEXT
Each of the four chapters which follow overlap one another
chronologically. To some extent the partitioning of
McDonald's life during this period reduces the intensity of
the impact which the simultaneous recounting of these events
would otherwise have. However, for purposes of clarity and
analysis this approach seems better than endeavoring to relate
the events concurrently. During this time McDonald did many
of the same kinds of things which he did in the previous
chapter, but the central issue became the Condon Study. The
study should be viewed in the context which was developed in
chapters one and two.
For a decade, and in some instances longer, the UFO groups
desired a full-scale scientific investigation of the UFO
phenomenon. Then in early 1966 as a result of numerous
reported sightings, public outcry, the quiet behind the scenes
work of J. Allen Hynek, the NICAP lobby effort, the
recommendations of the Ad Hoc UFO Committee of the Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board and possibly other pressures the Air
Force agreed to fund such a study by independent university
contractors.
However, the project proved a mixed blessing because while it
provided the long-awaited scientific analysis, on the other
hand the funding came from the Air Force. No one knew what
the implications of such funding were, if any, or what strings
might be attached, but they (meaning those seriously concerned
with the UFO problem) were circumspect regarding the Air Force
involvement. Although impossible to demonstrate that a
conspiracy existed to hide the facts about UFOs, even those
who would argue no such plot existed were hesitant about Air
Force backing
of the proposed research. For most UFO watchers saw the
Condon Study as an opportunity either to legitimate UFO
studies in the halls of academe if the Condon team reported
that the phenomenon warranted further study or, to the
contrary, set the field of Ufology back ten years if the final
report concluded the phenomenon were nonsense.
The make-up of the research project staff and the duration of
the Air Force contract for the study added to this concern.
The Air Force feared that anyone already involved with the UFO
problem whether pro or con would bring these predispositions
to the project and make any resulting conclusions suspect.
Consequently, unlike the motivation for doing most other
research -- namely, interest on the part of the investigators
-- the staff of the Condon Study, by Air Force stipulation,
was chosen for its lack of prior interest. This, combined
with the year-and-one-half contract, tended to frighten those
UFO researchers familiar with the problem because they
considered the contract period too short a time to become
apprised of the complexity of the UFO situation and also
conduct meaningful analysis.
With these sorts of considerations in mind we can better
understand McDonald's actions in 1967, 1968 and 1969. We have
already seen his distress begin to develop in 1966. First he
thought he might be the principal investigator. When that
possibility waned he volunteered his services to
"sell" the
none too popular project to any lukewarm scientists who might
be candidates for the job of principal investigator. When the
Air Force failed to take advantage of his offer this not only
annoyed him, but also made him wonder about Air Force
intentions. Once Edward Condon's name appeared as principal
investigator and the University of Colorado received
designation as the research site
McDonald again offered his services in an advisory capacity.
When Condon was slow to invite him to Boulder he chafed at the
bit and, as we saw, eventually obtained an invitation by sheer
perseverance. What he found at CU did not please him and he
concluded that the project had to be closely monitored. It
should be remembered that by the end of 1966 he had lived with
the conclusion that UFOs were a form of extraterrestrial
visitation for some five or six months and consequently
believed the issue to be the most important problem facing
twentieth century science. He felt action had to be taken
immediately and believed himself more qualified than any other
academic to pursue the problem. It is at this point that we
begin the story in 1967.
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Early Concerns
Condon was always considered a good after-dinner speaker; he knew
how to tell a funny anecdote. With the UFO contract under his belt
the number of invitations he received increased. He, being the type
of person who enjoyed such occasions, did not refuse. It would be a
number of these speeches which would cause him difficulties within
the UFO world.
As early as January Hall wrote McDonald that he, and therefore NICAP,
worried about Condon's public statements. He indicated that if
Condon continued in his ways that NICAP might have to withdraw
support from the project or possibly ask for a new project or project
leader.
[1]
Hall's concern was for an article in the Elmira Star Gazette
of January 26, 1967 which quoted Condon as saying in his Corning
Glass Works talk:
It is my inclination right now to recommend that the government get
out of this business. My attitude right now is that there is nothing
to it, but I'm not supposed to reach a conclusion for another year.
It might seem strange that Hall could make the above threat of
severing relations with CU, but it must be kept in mind that
Condon planned to use NICAP data and was already in the
process of establishing a nationwide UFO reporting network
using NICAP members. In addition, the people in NICAP were
the most vociferous about UFOs. If NICAP withdrew support and
the Condon Study results were negative, NICAP members, many
feared, would not accept the findings. Condon reacted by
writing a letter to Donald Keyhoe claiming that the press had
distorted his remarks.
[2]
This turn of events markedly affected McDonald. He decided
that the time had come to put his case before the National
Academy of Science (NAS). In a letter to Philip Seitz,
President of the NAS, he did just that. He explained his
previous "quiet study" strategy with the Committee on
Atmospheric Sciences and his more recent lobbying efforts
which failed to bear fruit. Then he indicated that the
researchers at CU were not aware of the dimensions of the
problem and called CU a good beginning but too small a
project. Finally he turned to the responsibility of the NAS
to keep the public informed on UFO matters. He said he wanted
to brief Seitz because the subject would be of overriding
public concern in a few months. He argued that the
interrelationship between science and the public was of great
importance and that the NAS should be prepared to answer the
questions on UFOs which would shortly be asked.
[3]
At this juncture it appears that McDonald hoped to arrange a briefing
with Seitz by convincing him that the NAS might be caught
napping on UFOs and come under considerable public criticism.
One thing McDonald probably did not know was that Seitz was a
former student of Condon, respected him, and believed he could
do the job in Boulder adequately.
While providing a briefing at CU Hall wrote back to Keyhoe
regarding Condon's lack of interest in McDonald's offer of
aid. Hall claimed that it was hinted that McDonald's tilt
with the Air Force over ringing Tucson with missile sites made
him persona non grata with the Air Force and consequently
Condon didn't want to cause himself problems by asking
McDonald for advice.
[4]
Approximately a week later McDonald wrote Condon making another
consulting offer and pointing out that he had ten months of
experience to draw on.
[5]
The same day he dropped a note to Bob Low, the project administrator,
stating that he would put himself at Low's disposal the three days
Low would be in Tucson to meet with the Lorenzens of APRO.
[6]
On January 22 Seitz wrote a terse reply to McDonald in which he said
that the NAS had an interest in his remarks and took the matter
seriously. Seitz further hoped McDonald kept in close contact with
Condon.
[7]
After Low's visit to Tucson he wrote McDonald a positive letter in
which he expressed his desire to arrange an opportunity for McDonald
to speak in Boulder. Low mentioned his attempt to get Norman Levine,
an electrical engineer who had just finished his Ph.D. at the
University of Arizona, and William Hartmann, a UA astronomer, on the
project. With regard to putting further UA people on the payroll Low
said he knew everyone from the UA was independent but the public
didn't and the impression left with the public had to be
considered.
[8]
Apparently at this point McDonald wanted to confront Condon
publicly. In a letter to Neubold Noyes, in charge of the UFO
Panel discussion to be presented at the American Society of
Newspaper Editors convention, McDonald said he had Donald
Menzel of Harvard committed to appear, but couldn't get Condon
because Low opposed the idea.
[9]
One way or another McDonald obtained an appointment to see
Seitz at the NAS on April 19. Two weeks prior to that he
wrote Seitz to firm up the engagement. While so doing he
included an extensive list of his latest interest articulation
efforts, no doubt to impress Seitz with the names of the
various governmental, scientific and military groups he had
addressed and to insure that Seitz realized how important the
UA atmospheric physicist considered the problem.
[10]
In a note received several weeks thereafter Low began by asking
McDonald how he would spend a large UFO grant if he hypothetically
had one. Then he touched upon the issue which brought him to write,
namely a public statement by McDonald that Condon did not spend much
time on the project. Low assured McDonald that what he had told him
in Tucson was that Condon did not spend much time with the sighting
files, but nevertheless he did contribute one-half of his time to the
project.
[11]
His continued concern with winning over Brian O'Brien, Chairman of
the AFSAB, led McDonald to forward O'Brien copies of his latest UFO
talks. In passing he mentioned that CU just didn't have enough
scientific talent to get the job done.
[12]
In early August McDonald went up to Boulder to brief the project
staff on his recent Australian trip during which he interviewed more
than eighty UFO sighting witnesses. He returned from Boulder with a
jaundiced view according to a missive sent to Mary Lou Armstrong,
Condon's
administrative secretary and project worker. How a balanced report
could be done as long as Condon refused to personally do interview
work escaped him, although Roy Craig, a physical chemist from CU,
impressed him.
[13]
Here we see the schism which would appear much more evident in the
future. McDonald could talk and write openly to Armstrong and a few
others, although Condon and Low, the leaders, remained at a distance.
This distance apparently resulted from a number of the staff becoming
convinced the UFO phenomenon was a significant scientific problem,
possibly of extraterrestrial origin, while it seemed to these same
individuals that Condon and Low did not take the matter seriously.
The disquietude evinced by McDonald to Armstrong he also passed along
to Hall. He said he tried to talk Condon into interview work, but to
no avail. In fact, Condon fell asleep twice during the briefing.
When informed of the $50,000 contract to be given to Stanford
Research Institute to prepare a paper on anomalous propagation
phenomena in radar sightings McDonald said he suggested a $3.00
paperback on the subject. He concluded by saying both Armstrong and
Wadsworth, the latter being a graduate student working on the
project, were upset with Low.
[14]
In a letter to Hughes McDonald again spoke of his pessimism regarding
CU. He said that Ben Herman, a consultant to the project from the UA,
"tells me they put on a show for me, and that after I
left everything lapsed back into its normal apathy."
[15]
However, McDonald must have received encouragement upon reading a
note from Armstrong a few days later. She told him there was still
hope, that Dave Saunders, a CU psychometrician on the staff, would
take a strong positive stance if dissension arose in the Spring as
she expected it would. She felt that his data-based computer runs
gave him
the power to make or break the study.
[16]
Ten days later Saunders distributed an alternative outline to the one
developed by Low for the final report. It was, in effect, a
dissenting viewpoint. It remained to be seen how many of the staff
would agree to it.
Although McDonald might have been heartened by Armstrong's remarks he
felt the situation had deteriorated to the point that the NAS had to
establish a panel to escalate scientific concern over UFOs. He told
Seitz this and also laid out in general terms the panel's tasks while
hurling a few barbs at CU. Finally, he argued it was the
responsibility of the NAS to confront the problem and so he asked for
an appointment to discuss the matter.
[17]
In mid-September Condon gave another of his UFO talks. This one was
for an Atomic Spectroscopy Symposium of the National Bureau of
Standards (NBS) in Gaithersburg, Maryland. A friend of McDonald's,
William Bickel, attended and he wrote a memo to McDonald expressing
his disgust with Condon's funny, entertaining stories about
contactees, hoaxes, and research problems confronted because of
ridicule, when Condon had an opportunity to stimulate the interest of
the best atomic physicists and spectroscopists in the country.
[18]
In a letter to Low discussing UFO cases McDonald raised the issue of
the NBS talk and mentioned his concern over the matter. Low did not
respond.
[19]
Donald Keyhoe at NICAP received a copy of the Bickel memo from
McDonald and felt it had to be followed up. McDonald suggested to
Keyhoe that he indicate that he had the memo to strengthen his
bargaining position with Low. McDonald said he would wait until
October 4 to see if Keyhoe obtained an answer. If he did not then
McDonald would write Condon himself.
[20]
However, before this could be settled McDonald received word
of another Condon slap at the UFO phenomenon. This time while
speaking with the press on September 27 he indicated
disillusionment with the UFO business, almost wished he could
drop it, and had praise for a Science article on UFOs by
William Markowitz, a physicist at Marquette University, who
attempted to demonstrate the impossibility of interplanetary
travel given the physical laws as we know them. Lastly,
Condon said he agreed with Markowitz that twenty-first century
physics would laugh at us for investigating UFOs.
[21]
As a result of the above statements made by Condon a concerned
William Hartmann, a UA astronomer doing UFO photo analysis for the CU
project, called McDonald. He tried to explain that Condon's
isolation from the project permitted him to concentrate on crackpot
cases while the remainder of the staff pursued better data. He said
he (Hartmann) talked the staff out of a September 28 press release
refuting Condon's September 27 remarks and as far as Hartmann could
tell a blow-up would probably be avoided, as would a minority report.
It was likely that a compromise would be reached and even if a
dissenting report were written only Condon's voice would be heard.
Hartmann believed that Condon's statements subtly sealed the lips of
the project staff who could not contradict him and found this
reinforced by Bob Low's comments that the staff would now be forced
to go along with Condon. At this time McDonald was about to write
Condon, a strategy Hartmann seconded, and in fact urged McDonald to
emphasize in his letter the need for Condon to keep in close touch
with his staff.
[22]
This increased McDonald's concern for the future of UFO studies. His
worst fears were apparently being realized. To determine if this
were true he augmented his efforts to gather information about the
inside workings of the UFO project and the authenticity of various
public statements attributable to Condon.
Considered a fighter by all who knew him, Condon responded to
the commotion over his public utterances not by conciliation,
but by further inflammatory remarks. On October 16 the New
York Times quoted him as saying he was inclined to think
UFO studies should be discontinued unless someone came up with
a new idea on how to approach the problem.
[23]
Meanwhile, McDonald got together with Norman Levine and David
Saunders who were on the project. They discussed Condon's NBS
speech, the untenability of the Air Force conspiracy
hypothesis and the possibility of Air Force interference in
the project if the research appeared to be coming to a
positive conclusion.
[24]
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Levine reacted to some of McDonald's questions in a note in which he
said that:
[25]
Point five was important to McDonald because Low spent project money
to attend an astronomical conference in Europe, but did not contact
any European UFO researchers. Low's stop at Loch Ness annoyed him
further because it seemed to put UFOs and the Loch Ness Monster in
the same category of phenomena. This was something McDonald did not
accept.
By this time the disquietude at NICAP had reached a new high.
Keyhoe wrote two letters, one each to Low and Condon,
demanding answers to numerous questions related to the
credibility of Condon and the research project. He outlined
the various ups and downs which NICAP had had with Condon,
including the severing of relations two months earlier a; a
result of Condon's public statements. Throughout Keyhoe
showed concern that Condon would coopt NICAP into appearing to
endorse by association a negative, perniciously concocted
final report.
[26]
The end of November found McDonald thinking beyond the CU
study. Based upon a letter to Saunders we can conclude that
they, along with Norm Levine, had already begun discussing the
future of UFO studies. McDonald asserted that all federal
research agencies were waiting for the outcome at Boulder
before committing themselves. He felt a NASA size effort was
in order, but if CU were negative then a different strategy
would be needed. He believed a professional organization that
focused on the study of UFOs was necessary to raise money in
the form of dues to support a journal and research. Such an
organization would be made up of academics and be
research-oriented. He wanted to discuss this with Saunders
and Levine the next time they met.
[27]
Condon replied to Keyhoe, as did Low, assuring Keyhoe of the
integrity and independence of the project. Condon would not respond
to most of the questions because he said the answers would give NICAP
advance information about project conclusions. He asserted that all
of his public statements were unbiased. He also provided assurances
that if
dissenting opinions existed when the research concluded that
they would appear in the report.
[28]
However, McDonald remained unconvinced of Condon's good intentions.
On December 11 he wrote Aime Michel, considered the foremost European
UFO researcher, to inform him that Condon's staff did not share
Condon's attitudes and "our hope lies with them."
[29]
However, by the 28th in another letter to Michel, McDonald
indicated that he was "disappointed and disillusioned
with Condon." Evidently more so than previously for he
said, "some confrontation is going to have to be effected.
This is difficult to engineer. A number of us are working on
that problem and thinking about it as carefully as we
can."
[30]
1968 brought with it the confrontation which McDonald desired.
He played the major role in this episode which turned on the
infamous "Low memo" mentioned in the previous
chapter. Although intended as one facet of a multi-pronged
offense launched by McDonald against Condon in an attempt to
change the direction of the project, it turned out that the
"Trick Memo," as it came to be called, became the central
topic of discussion for several months. This began with a
letter from McDonald to Low in late January in which he
detailed his criticisms.
>
He wrote to Low because of a phone conversation they had
engaged in a few days earlier in which Low became upset when
McDonald directed some harsh comments toward the
administration of the project. He began the letter by saying
he wanted to outline his main concerns about the project and
that he saw no reason for Low to become upset. He argued that
criticism at that time was important because it could
influence the outcome of the research, and even though an
unusual step to take prior
to the completion of a study he nonetheless felt justified in
doing so because the future of UFO research hung in the
balance.
McDonald's major points revolved around Condon's negative
press statements, his preoccupation with crackpots, his
refusal to examine witnesses in good cases, the limited amount
of communication between Condon and his staff and the lack of
investigation of obfuscation cases (cases in which McDonald
felt the Air Force had prohibited or inhibited investigation).
In addition, he discussed the Low memo in straightforward
terms suggesting that its presence in the "open
files" meant it no doubt could easily be explained. He
also brought up what he called project communication problems,
the waste he considered the $50,000 Stanford Research
Institute radar study contract, the inappropriateness of
Aldora Lee's opinion poll 15 months after the project began,
and the scientific unproductiveness of bringing Air Force
intelligence officers up to Boulder for a briefing when the
project staff were about to begin writing the final report.
[31]
A letter from McDonald to Hall indicates that they viewed the
Low memo as very important, and quite possibly their major
weapon, from the beginning. As early as January 31 McDonald
told Hall that after a talk with Gordon Lore, NICAP Assistant
Director (Hall had left NICAP), and Donald Keyhoe that they
resolved to get the memo on the record at the NAS and at the
Air Force Office of Scientific Research. Saunders apparently
concurred in this tactic and McDonald commented that an NAS
staff member agreed that this was the best way in which to
accomplish his objectives at NAS.
[32]
By February 9 McDonald had not heard from Condon regarding the
critical letter of January 31 to Low and, concerned that
Condon might not rise to the bait, penned him a note.
McDonald indicated that via CU administrative channels he knew
that Condon had been apprised of the letter to Low. He told
Condon that he intended to send copies to the NAS as a first
step in making his case; a more detailed statement would
follow.
[33]
The same day McDonald sent off a statement to the NAS. He submitted
the 1/31/68 letter to Low along with the Low memo, and his United
Aircraft Research Labs paper presented January 26, 1968. He
considered these a preamble to the more detailed criticisms of the
"lack of scientific open-mindedness and lack of scientific vigor in
project administration" which would follow and stated that they were
in keeping with the concerns which he expressed to NAS staffers
Coleman and Sievers on 4/20/67, Coleman on 9/29/67 and Coleman again
on 1/30/68.
[34]
The repercussions of McDonald's 1/31/68 letter to Low were much
greater than anticipated. On February 8 Condon called Saunders and
Levine to his office, accused them of stealing the memo from private
files and fired them from the project for
"incompetence." McDonald
wrote Saunders and Levine expressing his distress that Condon had
such small regard for the scientific matters at stake. He also
regretted that Saunders and Levine had "to pay so high a price for
getting on with a proper scientific investigation."
[35]
It seems that McDonald had second thoughts about the interpretation
which the NAS staffers might put on his forwarding of the Low memo
and so he wrote a note to qualify his actions. He explained that
only
project members and those with a scientific concern for the project
had copies. He said the NAS received one because of its
responsibility in the area.
[36]
He also evinced a concern that Keyhoe of NICAP, known for his
publicity exploits, might over-react to the situation. He explained
to Keyhoe that Saunders and Levine would not go to the press and
intended to respond solely at the NAS level until it was certain what
the NAS would do. Consequently there was no need for NICAP to get
involved in the behind-the-scenes activities.
In the same letter McDonald conveyed a bit of the thinking underlying
his own involvement. He felt that Condon used the incompetence
excuse for the firings to insure that reporters would not look for
the memo. He indicated that Condon called Dr. Harvill, president of
the UA, to tell Richard Kassander, McDonald's superior, that he
(Condon) would soon contact Kassander demanding the return of the
memo. However, McDonald had briefed Kassander on the situation and
so Kassander told Condon to call McDonald if he wanted the
memo.
[37]
In troubled times McDonald usually got off a note to Jim
Hughes his project monitor to keep him informed; this was no
exception. He told Hughes of the events which occurred and
passed along copies of the memo and NAS correspondence which
he wanted Hughes to keep confidential. He said he forwarded
the material to keep Hughes apprised in light of the day when
he would apply to the ONR for funding to do UFO work. He told
Hughes that any discussion of these matters should go to his
home address because he didn't want such explosive material
channeled through his department.
[38]
A cordial letter which must have infuriated McDonald arrived
from Seitz. He contended that Condon was a distinguished
scientist who took his work seriously; press and grapevine
accounts no doubt were superficial. Seitz indicated that the
project had to run its course, but he would discuss McDonald's
suggestions with Condon at the next opportunity.
[39]
Condon answered McDonald's letters with questions and
accusations of his own. He asserted that the Low memo was
stolen from private files because it bore a date prior to the
commencement of the project. Referring to his talk with
Kassander he said he had done so because he thought the memo
had been misrepresented to McDonald and once McDonald
understood that he would return it. Now that he realized that
McDonald would not return it he considered such conduct
gravely unethical.
Furthermore, Condon said the review request of the project
which McDonald made to Coleman at the NAS puzzled him. He
wanted to know if McDonald desired a review prior to the
completion of the report, or a review of the situation as a
whole. Even though McDonald had adopted an adversary position
with respect to the project in Condon's eyes, he closed by
asking McDonald's cooperation on several procedural matters
concerned with UFO Investigation.
[40]
In a newsy note to Hughes, McDonald forwarded the Seitz and
Condon retorts with the comment that the "NAS will not
pick up the hot potato." He asked Hughes to keep the
letters confidential and hoped they would bear on getting him
some support in the future. Regardless of the cold shoulder
given him by the NAS he indicated to Hughes that he intended
to write up and forward the statement of concern already
begun.
[41]
By this time Saunders and Levine had started legal action
against Condon for the use of "incompetence" as the
reason for their firings.
Mrs. Saunders wrote McDonald thanking him for the support he
gave the fired pair in a press release which appeared in the
Denver Post. She was worried because Condon allegedly told
Saunders, "for this (releasing the memo) you should be
professionally destroyed."
[42]
McDonald again wrote Aime Michel to ask him to keep European
ufologists abreast of the CU situation. He told Michel that
"behind the scenes" efforts to force changes in the project
were in progress. He said that although Hynek's participation
had been hoped for, he nevertheless dropped out. The loss of
Saunders and Levine, according to McDonald, seemed a high
short-term loss but would be worth it in the long run.
Incompetence not conspiracy was the villain, along with
Condon's prestige, which proved a formidable weapon, as
attested to by the lack of NAS action.
[43]
It is difficult to assess what McDonald thought would be
gained from publicly attacking Condon in UFO circles, but this
is what he did and advocated. In a note to Charles Bowen,
editor of the British Flying Saucer Review, he asked that
Bowen speak out against Condon's project management if he felt
this were possible in good conscience.
[44]
Through his inside channels McDonald learned more about
happenings at CU and passed this along to Hughes. Apparently
a staff meeting took place at which Condon received
considerable criticism. It appeared that he saw for the first
time that the project had gotten into Low's hands and that Low
was incapable of running it.
[45]
McDonald was more informative in writing Hall the same day.
He said that Roy Craig would be the primary investigator with
the departure of Saunders and Levine and Craig might leave
according to rumor if Low were not fired. Moreover, while
Condon told Craig he could not go as
far as the ETH, he did say that Craig could write report
conclusions in which UFOs were considered a serious problem
warranting further attention. McDonald suggested caution,
however, since people on the project claimed that Condon could
not be trusted.
On the legal front McDonald planned to get a lawyer to force Condon
to retract various charges, in particular, that McDonald had coerced
Saunders and Levine into stealing the memo. Saunders and Levine were
also proceeding with legal steps as mentioned previously.
[46]
About the same time Mary Lou Armstrong, Condon's administrative
secretary and full participant in the project, proffered her
resignation. In a ten-page letter she argued that Low was the cause
of the project's problems. She enumerated nine points which
portrayed Low in a negative light and suggested that if Condon had
directed the project the conflictual situation would have been
avoided.
[47]
This letter was cause for rejoicing on the part of McDonald and
others of his persuasion because it seemed that this placed more
pressure on Condon to take a further look at the conclusions his
project would endorse. For at this time a set developed by Low
already circulated among the staff.
The gravity of Armstrong's actions are best revealed by the letter
through which Condon replied. He apparently spoke with her on the
phone and then wanted to reaffirm the confidentiality of the
resignation. He said he would consider it both unethical and a grave
offense to reveal its contents which he suspected people would tempt
her to do.
[48]
On February 28 William Messing, McDonald's attorney, wrote to Condon.
He informed Condon that unless he retracted the accusations made to
Kassander, Harvill and the NAS in ten days Messing would have to take
all necessary steps to protect McDonald's legal remedies.
[49]
On still another front McDonald, Saunders, Levine and
Armstrong took action of their own. They met with John
Fuller, who previously wrote two UFO books, and now planned to
pen an expose of the CU project focusing on the Low memo. He
spoke with Condon, Low and Manning (the latter being the
recipient of the memo) but received "no comments."
McDonald told Hall he expected the article to appear in
Look in four to six weeks. He also argued that
although the NAS had taken no action, that once the article
came out it would have to, if only behind the scenes.
[50]
In writing the article McDonald assured Fuller that he could
count on the cooperation of William Bickel who wrote the note
to McDonald describing Condon's NBS talk.
[51]
Condon said in his February 15 note to McDonald that he had
not studied McDonald's January 31 letter to Low, so in his
response McDonald asked Condon to do so. In addition, he
spoke to Condon's other points, the most important being, in
McDonald's eyes, the use of "stolen" and
"coerced" in his 2/15 letter and the intimation that
McDonald had not attempted to cooperate with CU.
With regard to the former McDonald said he did not participate
in any coercion or theft. He demanded a retraction which
would go to himself, Kassander and Seitz. He said he wanted
to hear from Condon on those charges. Concerning the charge
of non-cooperation McDonald detailed his distress with the
project going back to an 8/1/67 conversation with Condon.
Moreover, he argued that this statement on the part of Condon
revealed how little he knew about his own project, whereupon
McDonald proceeded to list his efforts to cooperate with Low
and Condon from as early as 10/16/66.
[52]
After his response to Condon, McDonald sent an enraged note in
answer to Low's missive of 2/2/68 in which Low asked for case
material in a way which McDonald interpreted as feigning
naivete concerning McDonald's past offers of aid. Probably
McDonald suspected this to be an effort on Low's part to
develop "files protection" regarding the
relationship of the project to McDonald just in case an
investigation of the project were ever made.
McDonald asserted that the letter had a hollow ring to it; that it
was written in a style suggesting Low had just heard about his
(McDonald's) interest in UFOs. He said he found the events at
Boulder shocking and was still waiting for a retort to his critical
letter of 1/31/68.
[53]
In his fifth letter of the day McDonald sent off a dissatisfied reply
to Seitz at the NAS. He was sorry the concern shown by Seitz was so
slight and paraphrasing Seitz said, "I think it will be
scientifically undesirable to let the Condon study run its course."
He was upset that the material he had sent Seitz (the 1/31/68 letter
to Low and the Low memo) had not convinced people at the NAS that
Condon and Low had a preset bias which the Air Force overlooked. In
the selection of the NAS Review Panel he hoped this would be
considered.
[54]
Condon wrote McDonald to the effect that he rejected
McDonald's notion that the memo was taken from "open
files." That it was done surreptitiously was proof enough
for Condon that the perpetrators were engaged in wrong-doing.
He believed McDonald's conduct was unethical and explained
that, because the issue had become a legal matter, he had been
advised to terminate correspondence by his attorney.
[55]
McDonald, after mentioning that he wanted to be included in the
indemnification insurance he understood the Look
lawyers were considering
for contributors to the Low memo article, told John Fuller he was
glad the Look editors cleared the manuscript. He said,
"I feel sure
that its impact on scientific attitudes (as well as public attitudes)
concerning the handling of the UFO problem will have a most salutary
effect."
[56]
However, he believed the article needed several
sentences indicating Harriet Hunter (a project staff member)
confronted Low with the memo in October 1967. This would thwart, he
thought, Condon's claim that it was done behind his and Low's
backs.
[57]
Meanwhile McDonald decided to postpone any legal action against
Condon for maligning his good name. He told Hall he felt it would be
a tactical error to pursue legal instead of scientific channels in a
dispute which was essentially scientific.
[58]
When the Look article finally came out McDonald found
it a bit short at 5,000 words, but he believed the salient
points were put into the open record. He sent fifteen copies
off to various foreign UFO groups.
[59]
On April 30, a day prior to publication, Keyhoe managed to
complicate the already confused situation by calling a NICAP
press conference "to blow it all open." What annoyed
Keyhoe was the fact that Look did not intend to give NICAP a
box comment in the article, and that Fuller and the Look
editors refused to see him in order to avoid a confrontation
on the issue. At the press conference Keyhoe broke relations
with the Condon Study, accused Condon of a conspiracy
(according to the press) and released copies of the memo to
the press, which angered Saunders, Saunders' lawyer and
Fuller.
[60]
Saunders' concern was primarily with his court case against Condon.
He feared that what Keyhoe said might get back to Boulder and hurt
his chances,
particularly since Philip Klass had taped the press conference and
reportedly took it to the AFOSR.
[61]
At this point it would appear that the NAS did not react as McDonald
expected and so he took his case to other quarters. It is unclear
whether he approached Science or vice-versa. In fact, the situation
is further confused by a letter to Science from one of
its editors, Daniel Greenberg.
[62]
In it Greenberg responded to Lewis Branscomb's criticisms
[63]
of the article which finally did appear by saying that
initially Condon approached Science, which already
planned an article on CU, when he (Condon) thought he would
have to counter the negative publicity from the Look
article. When the negative publicity failed to materialize he
refused to cooperate with Science and said he did not
want a story done. At any rate in early June, McDonald wrote
Philip Boffey, an editorial writer for Science,
enclosing papers, background material, and his 3/5/68 letter
to Condon. He urged Boffey to carry the matter as far as
possible in the hope that Science might be able to
rectify some of the neglect accorded the subject. Referring
to his 3/5/68 letter he said, "This whole thing is an
unprecedented situation and only my strong conviction that
we're dealing in the UFO problem with a matter of high
scientific importance which Condon was going to casually
reinter has led to my pursuing some of these courses."
[64]
Boffey eventually wrote an article critical of the Condon Project for
Science.
[65]
During this same period Congressman Roush of Indiana, who with
McDonald engineered the House Science and Astronautics Committee
hearings on UFOs in July of 1968, wrote Seitz at the NAS, probably at
McDonald's request, making a few suggestions. He wanted the NAS to:
Roush said he would suspend a Government Accounting Office review of
the project which he had initiated until the NAS finished its
review.
[66]
Another attempt at obtaining publicity, this time with
Industrial Review Magazine, did not work out as well as
the Science gambit. When the magazine first took an
interest in CU -- with or without McDonald's prodding is
unclear -- Condon who was on the editorial board of the
magazine, tried to dissuade the board from the story. When he
failed he resigned from the board.
[67]
However, the writer assigned to the story, an A. J. Cote,
could not come around to seeing the Condon Study as McDonald
did. In fact, he reached the point where he felt he had laid
the groundwork to indict either the project or its critics,
but he couldn't come down off the fence until he saw the final
report. So, after writing an introductory article, he decided
not to write the final piece. For Cote it was a question of
whose accusations to believe and only the report could settle
the matter.
[68]
It would appear that he did not write the final article even after
the release of the report. This was a blow to McDonald after his
expenditure of considerable time and energy in trying to convince
Cote of the efficacy of his position.
Activity on the part of McDonald with respect to the CU study
slackened during the summer months. This was due to his intense
involvement in the July House Hearings mentioned above and their
aftermath. Nevertheless, in October his concern for the outcome of
the Boulder study remained high, as evidenced by a note from
Phyllis O'Callaghan, Legislative Assistant to Representative
Roush. Apparently McDonald wrote to her asking that she use
the good offices of Roush to ferret out any information she
could obtain about the secret NAS Panel which was to review
the Condon Report. This was important to McDonald because he
wanted to contact the panel members to give them the inside
story on both the UFO project and the UFO phenomenon in
general.
O'Callaghan reported that Coleman at the NAS told her the
panel members were chosen by the President and members of the
NAS Council and would remain secret. The review would not
immediately be made public, but would be forwarded to the Air
Force and released at the discretion of the Air Force.
[69]
Intent upon informing the panel of what had taken place at CU
McDonald pursued another tactic. He contacted Saunders, who by that
time had written a book on his CU experience with Roger Harkins, a
Boulder reporter. He persuaded Saunders and his publisher to send
the galleys to the NAS. McDonald felt the book contained information
not in the Look article which would have a salutary
effect on the Academy scientists.
[70]
He undoubtedly took this action because of the above-mentioned letter
to Science by Branscomb. Both he and Saunders felt that since
Branscomb was a colleague of Condon at CU that the letter, which
defended Condon and indicted McDonald, presaged a negative final
report.
[71]
The Branscomb letter probably marked a turning point in tactics for
McDonald. Up to that time there was always the feeling that the
report might prove acceptable. However, three weeks after the letter
appeared
McDonald wrote to Hall to discuss good CU cases to begin
reinvestigating for a rebuttal to the report.
[72]
McDonald did not want to be caught by surprise and as a result
produce a rebuttal so far after the fact that the Condon Report would
be forgotten and the rebuttal, therefore, without impact.
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No doubt still looking toward the future possibility of funding from
the ONR McDonald sent the Saunders galleys to Hughes along with his
commentary on various parts of the book. He told Hughes that
Saunders' choice of UFO cases did not impress him, but the
administrative history of the project was well done and it heartened
him to see it in the open record.
[73]
The galleys eventually went to the NAS also, but only because the New
American Library, Saunders' publisher, sent them. Saunders himself
concluded that the galleys were not a scientific document and did not
feel he could forward them.
Concern for the report further heightened when McDonald heard
"a well-confirmed rumor" that Condon did not want
the study to go to the NAS or the public unless he were
covered for libel suits from witnesses. This made McDonald
believe that Condon categorized many witnesses as cheats,
frauds, unreliables or psychotics. This possibility increased
his desire to prepare the rebuttal and he told Hall to begin
assembling a list of all CU cases if one didn't already exist.
[75]
McDonald argued that Condon's desire for libel protection was
a ploy to "bottle up" the report. However, he
didn't think it would work because of the publicity received
by CU in the Look and Science articles. He
thought the Air Force would release the report even if it
meant providing the libel protection.
[76]
EDITOR'S NOTE: The footnote numbering on this page skips from 73 to 75; there is no footnote 74.
He continued with plans to organize the rebuttal. He told
Hall that they were not doing their homework; that the report
would be out shortly, they would be asked for comment and be
caught short if they did not hurry their preparation. The
case review could best be conducted, he thought, by getting
together with Saunders, Levine and Armstrong. To pursue post
Condon UFO work with a formal organization, without a good
critique of CU, McDonald considered sheer folly.
[77]
Although going forward with these plans McDonald continued his
efforts to get through to the NAS review panel. He offered Seitz his
comments and critique of the Condon Study which he argued would be
more helpful to the panel prior to its deliberations than
after.
[78]
In further rebuttal talk McDonald urged Hall to keep their
efforts quiet. He argued that the rumor chain could work both
ways and if the people at CU or the Air Force were to learn of
the cases that were undergoing investigation they might have
them reworked or excluded from the report. The next six to
eight weeks seemed critical to him.
[79]
In the interim Hall and his associates at NICAP worked up a
plan for the rebuttal. It included the release of UFOs: A New
Look along with a press release, the writing of a "white
paper" on the CU project with a covering press release, the
development of an analysis of the Condon Report with an
accompanying press release, and the systematic use of the
media by NICAP Subcommittees and Affiliates to present local
rebuttal throughout the nation.
[80]
When Seitz replied to McDonald it was to say that he thought there
would be ample time for criticism after the report and review came
out. He asserted that the panel was chosen to be as impartial as
possible and would be given the Roush Hearings to peruse as well as
McDonald's
congressional statement. [81] This implied that everything which McDonald had to say could be read in those two documents. McDonald retorted that the hearings did not touch upon the Air Force handling of the UFO problem or the Condon Study. Therefore, access to the Hearings would not permit the committee to weigh those points he believed most salient. McDonald closed by directly asking Seitz for the names of the Review Panel members. [82]
In correspondence with Malone he said Seitz and the secrecy at the
NAS made him uneasy. He thought the NAS was in the process of
digging itself into a hole with Condon and so he asked Malone to
provide any constructive suggestions that might occur to him.
[83]
The interaction with the NAS continued with McDonald, not hearing
from Seitz in six days, dashing off a quick note in a further attempt
to get what he considered vital information to the Review Panel. He
asked Seitz to give the Panel his 1/31/68 letter to Low as well as
his 2/9/68 and 3/5/68 letters to Seitz expressing grave concern.
McDonald claimed that he took every step since his 4/20/67 meeting
with Seitz with misgivings, but he continued to believe the problem
sufficiently important to justify his actions. He said that he wanted
confirmation that the correspondence had been forwarded to the Review
Panel.
[84]
The same day Seitz wrote McDonald that any material he had for the
Panel should be forwarded. However, the Panel had to remain
anonymous to avoid intrusions into the members' lives.
[85]
The entire situation looked ominous to McDonald after Lou Corbin told
him that John Sievers at the Academy left the impression that all the
panelists were Academy members. McDonald began attacking on another
front. Having once successfully engineered House Hearings on UFOs he
tried again. Jerry Pettis, a House member from California, publicly
discussed the possibility after the Redlands sightings in 1968. Now
McDonald told Malone that he contacted Representative Udall asking
him to urge Pettis to act.
[86]
Early January found McDonald eager to get at the soon-to-be released
report. When he determined the actual date that the NAS would make
it public he telegrammed Seitz, "Understand Condon Report available
Thursday. Will fly Washington Wednesday and phone Thursday about
studying copy at Academy or other source."
[87]
A week later he had been through the thousand-page document and was
up in arms, for as he anticipated the conclusions were, from his
perspective, negative. Condon stated:
[88]
Our general conclusion is that nothing has come from the study of
UFOs in the past 21 years that has been added to scientific
knowledge. Careful consideration of the record as it is available to
us leads us to conclude that further extensive study of UFO's
probably cannot be justified in the expectation that science will be
advanced thereby.
Properly conducted research, according to McDonald, would have
justified an unfavorable outcome. However, McDonald viewed
the research as prejudiced in approach, poorly conceived and
improperly conducted; hence a rebuttal was in order. This
took both verbal and written form, occupying him for most of
1969. He began by contacting Hynek at Northwestern to get him
to speak out on the Report. In addition, he got Kuiper,
Hartmann and others at the UA together in a colloquium for
purposes of indicting the Boulder study.
The following week McDonald put in full-time rechecking the work done
by Condon and his staff. He found numerous glaring errors epitomized
by the statement, "the more I look the worse it gets." He
admitted there were some bright spots, but they were not in the areas
which made a difference.
[89]
During this period plans went forward at NICAP for an extensive
written rebuttal. Constant contact between the NICAP staff,
particularly Hall, and McDonald took place. The latter intended to
make a large written contribution as well as softening up selected
government, military and academic audiences through speaking
engagements. His speaking feats, prodigious since October 1966, took
him to the podium seventy-eight times. In the first six months of
1969 he intensified these efforts by speaking out against the Condon
Report at eighteen different functions (see Appendix A for a list of
his speaking engagements).
He pursued another tactic by attempting to find disaffected
members of Condon's staff who would publicly denounce the
Report. He asked William Hartmann, who did the photo analysis
work for Condon, if he would make the same statements which he
had made at an IAP colloquium, where he disagreed with the
conclusions and recommendations of the Report, in a more
public way in Science. He also wondered if other
project members might join in since in a recent talk with
Franklin Roach (who did the section on astronaut sightings) he
found out that a number of the staff did not agree with the
conclusions of the Report.
[90]
Although Hartmann was not impressed by the substance of the UFO
phenomenon, he did express concern that it did not receive fair
treatment from journal editors. Nevertheless, he felt he could not
speak out against Condon because Condon's chapters of summary,
conclusions and recommendations were under his own name.
Consequently, to criticize Condon publicly for using wording
different from that used by
his staff in other chapters to describe the research of the latter
would be impossible. Hartmann further suggested that McDonald would
be wise to take his case to Science rather than to the speaking
circuit.
[91]
With Hynek, Saunders and others McDonald did a Voice of America tape
on the UFO problem and focused on the Condon Report. It disappointed
him that Condon refused to participate. At this time he mentioned to
Hughes undergoing the first major change in his position since June
1966, in that he believed the Condon Report was just one more example
of the Air Force receiving bad advice from the scientific community.
The Air Force did not foist a conspiracy on the public; the
scientific community failed to advise the Air Force wisely and a
twenty-year foul-up resulted.
[92]
McDonald also recruited others to help in the rebuttal. He asked
Hall if there was anything that needed doing which William Bickel, a
professor of Physics at the UA, might work on? He said Bickel's area
was plasma spectroscopy and he wanted to help.
[93]
By this time McDonald's ideas regarding the size of the rebuttal were
grandiose. He spoke in terms of 300 pages,
[94]
while Hall considered 150-200 pages the optimum length.
[95]
One might ask of what this rebuttal work consisted. To provide some
idea of what took place the following letter from McDonald to Ted
Bloecher at NICAP is presented in full.
[96]
Unfortunately, from McDonald's standpoint, after several months of
effort both on his part and on NICAP's, administrative problems at
NICAP forced the rebuttal to a halt. Nevertheless, the output from
its preparation provided McDonald with a great deal of grist for his
verbal and written critiques of the Condon Report.
February 26, 1969
Mr. Ted Bloecher Dear Ted: There are several points to briefly mention concerning cases that I have recently been checking.
If in the NICAP files you have anything from Mrs. Kelly Hearn, who I have yet to locate, I would very much appreciate copies. I see no point in asking you to copy what must be an extremely large file of material on the Michigan cases. However, if in going through it you should see any gems that you would guess that I have never studied, obviously I would be interested.
My California trip and other matters have gotten in the way of further writing of my RESA draft. I am getting back to it now.
I can't take time and space to elaborate, but I have some very
interesting information on the Kirtland case (page 141 in the Bantam
edition), as well as the 5/13 Colorado Springs radar case. Also, Norm
Levine has sent very relevant commentary on the Kincheloe case. I
have so much material to discuss that my principal problem is how to
boil it down.
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Best regards,
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JEM:mlt | |
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Nor did he give up on showing the Air Force the error of its ways.
Probably his revised position with respect to the poor scientific
advice provided in the past spurred him on. In the same time-frame
as his attempts to critique the CU study he again knocked on the Air
Force door. He informed William Price at AFOSR that he would be in
Washington from June 9-11 for an NSF Advisory Panel Meeting on the
Atmospheric Sciences and requested Price to arrange a colloquium on
UFOs for interested AFOSR personnel. He told Price that after four
months of checking he was very concerned about the Condon
Report.
[97]
Price said the Air Force no longer had responsibility
in the area, but McDonald could confer with the OAR and AFOSR people
who handled the CU contract.
[98]
Of paramount importance to McDonald was the anticipated Air Force
action on the Condon recommendations. He spoke at the AFOSR giving a
critique of the Condon Report and told Price that since the Condon
recommendations did not rule out further studies if properly
designed, that he would submit a proposal for funding.
[99]
A Colonel Whitfield Martin wrote to McDonald some time later
informing him that the AFOSR had no responsibility for UFOs and so he
could not encourage the submission of a proposal.
[100]
In his continuing effort to check cases in the Condon Report McDonald
became involved in another imbroglio. One of the problems with the
Condon Report, at least in the eyes of those interested in
reinvestigation of cases, was the fact that witness names were not
used and the geographic location of the sighting was given as a
section, such as the Northwest United States. Condon claimed he
adopted this approach so that witnesses would not be harassed after
publication of the report. Some of the cases investigated were well
enough known, however,
that McDonald could determine from the above information alone who to
contact. Yet, others were more obscure and it was to obtain
information on these cases that he contacted Dr. Ralph Ellsworth.
He phoned Ellsworth, head of Norlin Library at CU, to check some
cases in the Project files which Condon presented to the Western
Historical Collection in Norlin. Ellsworth indicated McDonald needed
Condon's permission to examine the material. McDonald thereupon
wrote Condon asking to see the files in May and/or June.
[101]
Condon replied that McDonald could not consult the files
because, "it is not our intention to make them publicly
available in the near future."
[102]
This undoubtedly brought McDonald to a slow boil. He had already
obtained copies of the radar cases analyzed by Gordon Thayer in the
Condon Report from Blue Book, but the witness names were excised. He
argued to Condon that because the project had access to the names and
because the copies of the Blue Book files held at Norlin were not a
direct outgrowth of the project that he should be permitted
access.
[103]
This argument did not persuade Condon. He reiterated
that project files would not be opened in the near future, especially
the Blue Book files. He asserted it would be inappropriate to do so
since the Air Force kept witness names confidential. To get
McDonald's hackles up he forwarded a copy of his American
Philosophical Society paper on UFOs in which he placed UFOs in the
category of occult nonsense.
[104]
To this McDonald responded by going over Condon's head. He contacted
Morris Udall who spoke with Secretary of the Air Force Seamans and
Representative Moss who chaired the House Freedom of Information
Subcommittee. He also forwarded Condon critiques of the Report and
told him that, "your Philadelphia and Irvine talks indicate you must
have no
real awareness of the weakness of the position you have
developed" and "in giving the Academy such a Report,
I believe you did science a direct disservice. That the
Academy processes could lead to endorsement is
disturbing."
[105]
In a terse note Condon thanked him for the enclosures and advised
McDonald of the termination of the correspondence.
[106]
This is the beginning of the CU data controversy.
Even though this only brings us halfway through 1969 it is as
far as McDonald's correspondence goes in that year with
respect to the Condon Study, although it picks up again in
mid-1970. This is largely due to his involvement in the SST
debate, his preparation for the 1969 AAAS UFO Symposium and
his battle with Philip Klass.
The CU data controversy is the last extended interaction of
McDonald with the CU project other than his intermittent
public talks, his Icarus review which put his criticism in a
respected scientific journal
[107]
and his AAAS paper presented in Boston in December 1969. Therefore,
this chapter will close by following his efforts to obtain access to
the Condon Project data in 1970 and 1971 and omit mention of any
other extant, but limited activities relating to the Condon Report.
In 1970 McDonald continued to develop his personal rebuttal to the
Condon Report. Failing to secure satisfaction from Secretary of the
Air Force Seamans and Congressman Moss, in June of 1970, after
waiting a year, he made another request of Ellsworth at Norlin
Library to access the Xeroxed Blue Book files which were part of the
Condon Project material.
[108]
He considered this a propitious time to act because of Condon's
recent retirement and he (McDonald) intended to travel to NCAR in
Boulder for a meeting in mid-July.
[109]
John Brennan, Curator of the Western Historical Collection, replied
for Ellsworth explaining that the
files could not be made available because the Library continued to
operate under the 4/22/69 instructions given by Condon.
[110]
This attempt aborted as did a personal conversation with Brennan on
July 6 while visiting NCAR on business; nevertheless, McDonald did
not consider this the end of the matter. He wrote Ellsworth again
using a slightly different approach. This time he pointed out that
the Blue Book cases were archived at Maxwell Air Force Base in
Alabama which meant they were available, but he stated that he had no
reason to be in that area of the country. However, he said he would
be in Boulder in late August and asked Ellsworth to obtain Condon's
permission to Xerox two to three dozen cases.
[111]
In reference to this problem in a letter to Saunders, McDonald
revealed the rationale behind his request. "I'm asking
if I can see just the Blue Book Xeroxes alone. Since those
items are not really research material generated by the Condon
Project, but rather provided at no cost by a government
agency, it would seem that my plea can't be brushed aside as
unreasonable."
[112]
Ellsworth responded that he asked Condon's permission and awaited a
reply.
[113]
McDonald informed Ellsworth that he would be in Fort Collins for an
American Meteorological Society meeting from August 24-28 and in
Boulder during September. He enclosed a list of the cases he wanted
to look at.
[114]
Several days later Ellsworth indicated to McDonald that Condon
refused access on the grounds that a confidential relationship
existed with the Air Force, but if the Air Force were to agree and
the material could be sorted out, it would be alright. Ellsworth said
that unfortunately the Library did not have the money or the staff to
do the
sorting and so he suggested McDonald travel to Maxwell Air Force Base
in Alabama to acquire the material.
[115]
We can obtain a feeling for Condon's position on this matter
by looking at the rationale he presented to Ellsworth for the
above response. He stated, "I believe that the material
consists of a mixed bag that needs a lot of sorting. If there
are some rough notes of the Colorado Project fieldwork in it,
I would expect him (McDonald) to pounce on that and criticize
our mode of handling it."
"But more formally, a refusal can be based on the fact
that the Air Force cases were given to us in confidence with
the understanding that names of persons involved in the cases
would not be disclosed, so to let him see the files would be
to violate our understanding."
[116]
McDonald reacted to the Ellsworth letter by writing Colonel William
Coleman at SAFOI in Washington to ask permission to Xerox the Blue
Book material.
[117]
He forwarded a carbon to Ellsworth and told him that Saunders claimed
the files were ordered in such a way as to minimize the staff time
involved in sorting the material.
[118]
Coleman's answer was to the effect that McDonald could have access to
the material if it could be worked out with the University of
Colorado.
[119]
Ellsworth followed this up by saying that it was alright with him but
McDonald still needed Condon's consent.
[120]
Finally Condon personally entered the fray. He told McDonald that
the project files were not a part of the Norlin collection, but were
only in storage there until he could decide what to do with them. He
went on to say, "On the basis of my previous experiences in dealing
with you I have decided that you will not be given access to any of
this material. As I read the fourth paragraph of Colonel Coleman's
letter
the names and addresses of witnesses are confidential. We have no
machinery for administering this provision of their
regulations."
[121]
McDonald actually received the above letter from Condon on
August 25. On August 24 while in Boulder he went to Norlin to
determine if he could have access to the files. He was told
that Condon removed them from the Library. He wrote Condon
reiterating his position that he only wanted Blue Book
Xeroxes, was already working with similar material from
Maxwell and, according to Ellsworth's 7/24/70 letter, only
needed Air Force permission and the cooperation of the CU
staff to get the files. He said that since his prior
correspondence made it clear that he had access to Maxwell
material, and Coleman's letter only dealt with the disclosure
of witness names in the scientific literature, and not with
the examination of the files, he found Condon's refusal on the
grounds that he had "no machinery for administering this
provision of their regulations" difficult to understand.
He asserted that he still wanted the material and claimed Condon
reversed himself on the conditions for access which he had previously
laid down. McDonald wanted to know if Condon thought the files were
his private property and, if so, if he considered it his right to
destroy them?
[122]
This closed the debate for 1970 because Condon never replied.
There is only one more chapter to the story. It came in
February 1971. Gordon Thayer, who did the radar case analyses
for the Condon Report and later had some second thoughts on
the UFO problem, agreed to write up the classic Lakenheath,
England radar case for the journal Aeronautics and
Astronautics of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics. He called McDonald for a copy of the Blue Book
file, for by that time
McDonald had made several trips to Maxwell, but McDonald told him to
get it from Condon since he (Thayer) worked at ESSA in Boulder.
Thayer replied that he asked Condon and was told that the files were
too bulky to store so he had destroyed them.
[123]
McDonald was furious, but to no avail. The attempt to guide the
Condon Study and then to rebut its findings was over. McDonald lost,
but what did he try to do, and how did he try to do it?
He operated within the framework established in the last
chapter. With this strategy he intended to legitimate UFO
research and in the process shift a paradigm. To accomplish
this he tried to insure a favorable outcome to the Condon
Study. For it was a well-recognized fact that the Boulder
project would determine the future funding policies for the
examination of UFO data in the short run and possibly for
decades, McDonald knew that, because at all the federal
agencies where he took his case they told him "to wait
for Colorado." The answer seemed to be, then, to offer
aid and guidance if necessary, through the completion of the
research.
McDonald used several tactics beginning in 1967 and continuing
through early 1971. In the beginning he offered Condon aid both to
help and to monitor CU. When that failed he offered what he
considered constructive criticism. Then he engineered a
confrontation with Condon and concurrent with all three of the
above tactics he took his case to higher authority in the
form of the NAS. Finally, after all else failed McDonald
went about the task of developing a rebuttal to the final
report.
In March of 1967 McDonald offered to brief Condon and asked
him to
appear on the American Society of Newspaper Editors Panel with Menzel
and Quintanllla, but Condon refused on both counts. A month later he
publicly stated that Condon did not spend much time on the project
and in August, after considerable persevering. Low asked him to brief
the project staff. He came away convinced that the project was in
trouble. Condon reinforced this feeling the following month when he
gave his infamous NBS talk about which McDonald protested to Low.
Condon's NBS talk was apparently a turning point, for after
that McDonald met with Saunders and Levine in early November
and talked of engineering a confrontation. This did not
materialize until two months later when McDonald sent his
letter critical of the CU project administration and of the
Low memo to Low. The letter caused Condon to fire Saunders
and Levine which resulted in their combining with McDonald and
Fuller to prepare the Look article exposing the inner
workings of the project. This, McDonald hoped, might turn the
project around.
While Saunders and Levine began legal action against Condon so
did McDonald. The latter felt that Condon owed him an apology
for claiming that he forced Saunders and Levine to steal the
Low memo. Eventually he discontinued the suit claiming that
it was a poor tactic in a primarily scientific matter.
McDonald's appeal to the NAS took place at the same time as
the above tactics. This was the result of his fear that
things were not what they should have been in Boulder.
Condon's February 1967 talk to the Corning Glass Ware Chapter
of the [Sigma Chi Iota] Honorary Fraternity exacerbated these
fears. This began McDonald's appeals to the NAS.
He wrote Philip Seitz, president of the NAS, in March to
explain that he wanted to brief Seitz on the UFO situation
because he didn't want the NAS to be caught unprepared when
the issue broke and the public began to ask questions. He
obtained a hearing with Seitz in April, prior to which he
forwarded some of his UFO work and a list of his speaking
engagements to impress the NAS president with the degree of
seriousness he imputed to the problem. McDonald's pleas
proved of little avail, so he bided his time for several more
months.
However, after his visit to Boulder in August he came away saddened
by Condon's attitude and wrote Seitz again. This time he asked that
the NAS set up a special review panel to look at UFO case material
independent of the Condon Study. Again Seitz told him to wait for
the results of Condon's research. That he could not do, for he saw
what he believed were progressively deteriorating conditions at CU.
So he engineered a confrontation over the Low memo and followed this
with another letter to Seitz in February 1968. He enclosed his
1/31/68 letter to Low which started the skirmish at CU (getting
Saunders and Levine fired), the Low memo, and earlier letters on the
Condon Project sent to Sievers and Coleman, both NAS staffers. In
McDonald's mind this constituted a preamble to the detailed criticism
of CU which would follow.
At this stage of the NAS appeal he feared Keyhoe might bring
the press into it. He wrote him not to do so, and indicated
that it could be pursued quietly at the NAS level. McDonald
expected action, but got none; he thought the study should be
stopped, but Seitz said it should run its course. He assumed
publication of the May Look article on the Low memo
would finally force the NAS to do something, yet again nothing
happened. As the months passed and the situation continued to
look grave McDonald
became sufficiently worried about the problem that in October he
contacted Representative Roush's administrative assistant, Phyllis
O'Callaghan to ask her to obtain the names of the NAS Panelists who
would review the Condon Report so that he could contact them.
Moreover, he talked Saunders' publisher into forwarding the galleys
of Saunders' forthcoming book on the Colorado Project to the NAS.
Then he followed this up a month later with an offer to Seitz of a
critique of the Condon Project for the NAS Review Panel. This was at
a time when he realized that he could not learn the names of the
panel members.
Seitz told him that his testimony at the July 1968 House Hearings
would be adequate to present his position to the Review Panel, but
McDonald claimed it would be inadequate and again asked for the
identities of the panelists. Before he received a reply he made a
last effort to convey what he considered vital information to the
panel. He asked Seitz in the last letter of his appeal to insure
that the Panel obtained copies of the 1/31/68 letter to Low and his
2/9/68 and 3/5/68 letters to Seitz.
Such were the tactics when it appeared that the Condon Report might
be reformed or exposed prior to its publication. By October 1968,
however, it seemed highly probable to McDonald that the Colorado
findings would be negative. Consequently, he began to prod Hall
about rechecking CU cases in order to get out a good rebuttal. He
felt that if it did not come out rapidly it would have a minimal
impact. Moreover, a good critique of the Report was necessary if the
academic UFO research organization which he contemplated were to
flourish in a post-Condon environment. Since they were starting early
McDonald told Hall to keep the rebuttal
cases quiet. He wanted to avoid the possibility that the
rumors would reach Boulder and result in the omission of the
rebutted cases from the Report.
When the Condon Report appeared in January 1969 McDonald went
through it in a week and began to contact academics to speak
against it. He spoke to government, military and academic
audiences (eighteen talks between January and June) to prepare
them for the prospective rebuttal. Along with Hynek and
Saunders he did a Voice of America tape critical of the Report
and he attempted to recruit disaffected Project members to
speak out against the research.
Finally, McDonald began to recheck sighting reports which led him to
the battle with Condon over the Xeroxed Blue Book cases, which were
probably just an excuse to get into the general project files.
Before resolution of the issue occurred he appealed to Ellsworth,
head of Norlin Library, Condon, Representative Morris Udall,
Secretary of the Air Force Seamans, Representative Moss and Colonel
Coleman at SAFOIS. Yet, despite his efforts Condon eventually won the
day by destroying the material.
Aid to the Project
Exposure of Project
The NAS
The Rebuttal
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